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TOO LATE FOR THE TRUTH? RETROACTIVITY AND
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR FILING 28 U.S.C. § 2255 PETITIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter AEDPA).'
Section 105 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 22552 to provide
for a one-year statute of limitations in which petitions for habeas
corpus must be filed. 3 The former § 2255 contained no statute of
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §105, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1994)).
2. A motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence brought under § 2255,
although similar in many ways, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Section 2255 is rather a
statutory supplement to writ. In re Hahserd, No. 96-8051, 1997 WL 523691 (6th
Cir. Aug. 25, 1997). Congress enacted § 2255 to allow the court which imposed
the sentence, as opposed to the court that happened to be near the prison in
which the person was incarcerated, to hear the petition. Id. at *1. Furthermore,
the remedy under § 2255 is more flexible than the limited scope of the traditional
writ. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended by Pub: L. No. 104-132 § 105, reads as
follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
A one-year statute of limitations shall apply to a motion under this
section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented in making a
motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
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limitations.4 The plain language of the amendment provides no
indication as to when the amended section should take effect.5
The result of this lack of direction has been inconsistent and often
unfair application of the limitations period throughout the federal
courts.
One approach taken by a number of courts has been to apply
the limitations period to pre-accrued claims.6 These courts have
tolled the statute from a date prior to the effective date of the
AEDPA. As a result, a prisoner who filed on April 25, 1996, but
whose conviction became final in 1992, would have his petition
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This application
reflects the minority approach.
A majority of courts, including every circuit court which has
addressed the issue, have provided a reasonable grace period after
April 24, 1996 for prisoners to bring their claims.' What is
deemed a reasonable time has ranged from seventy-two days to a
year.' However, these courts have provided sparse justifications
4. Prior to the AEDPA's enactment, delays of over a decade did not bar a
prisoner from seeking habeas relief. Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S.Ct. 1293 (1996).
5. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-518 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944
provides the following insight into the aims of § 105 of the AEDPA: "This title
incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus,
and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital
cases. It sets a one-year limitation on an application for a habeas writ and
revises the procedures for consideration of a writ in federal court." H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 104-518.
6. The following cases, three of which are from the Fourth Circuit, have
applied the amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to bar claims which accrued before the
effective date of the AEDPA: United States v. Smith, 966 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va.
1997); Clarke v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Va. 1997); Curtis v. Class,
939 F. Supp. 703 (D.S.D. 1996); Harold v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Md. 1996); United States v. Bazemore, 929 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
7. These courts have not barred claims filed after April 24, 1996 which
accrued prior to that date: Calderon v. United States, 112 F.3d 386 (9th Cir.
1997) (applying parallel time limit found in amended 28 U.S.C. 2254); United
States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1997); Peterson v. Demskie, 107
F.3d 92 (2nd Cir. 1997) (applying identical limitation under the amended 28
U.S.C. § 2244); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); United States v. Ramos, 971 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.
Pa. 1997); Zuluaga v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass. 1997); United
States v. Jones, 963 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Ortiz, No. 91-
1250, 1997 WL 214934 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1997); Smith v. United States, 945 F.
Supp. 1439 (D. Colo. 1996); United States v. Rienzi, No. 96-4829, 1996 WL
605130 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1996).
8. See Peterson, 107 F.3d at 93 (allowing a petition filed 72 days after the
effective date of the AEDPA to proceed).
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for granting the grace period. Furthermore, none of these courts
have adequately addressed the thorny question of retroactivity
which is central to the proper resolution of this issue.
In response to the judicially mandated grace period, the
Attorney General ordered the Department of Justice to impose a
one-year grace period before raising the statute of limitations as a
bar to petitions for habeas corpus. 9 Nevertheless, at least one
court, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, has
refused to recognize the grant.' °
This comment addresses the issue of whether the one-year
statute of limitations should control a petition filed after the
effective date of the AEDPA but based on a conviction which
became final more that one year prior to the effective date of the
act. By analyzing both the minority and majority approaches, this
comment demonstrates that the minority has misapplied the
recent Supreme Court opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
ucts." Furthermore, the purpose of this comment is to suggest
the correct framework for determining the proper temporal reach
of this statute.
II. DIscussIoN
A. The Landgraf Decision
In order to understand the rationale behind the various appli-
cations of the statute of limitations at issue, a discussion of Lan-
dgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court's most recent and
definitive opinion on retroactivity, is necessary. 2 In Landgraf,
the Court addressed the issue of whether amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, creating a right to recover compensatory and
punitive damages for Title VII violations, applied to cases pending
when the amendments were enacted. The court held that the
amendments applied only to cases which were filed after the
enactment of the statute. 13
The Court set forth the following test for determining when a
statute should be applied retroactively. First the court must
9. A sub-issue beyond the scope of this article is whether the Attorney
General can order the AEDPA not to be applied as enacted by Congress. Under
the Constitution, the executive branch is neither vested with the authority to
interpret or rewrite legislation, rather they are limited to enforcement.
10. See United States v. Smith, 966 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1997).
11. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Id.
19971 159
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determine whether Congress has prescribed the proper temporal
reach of the statute. If it has, "then there is no need to resort to
judicial default rules" and the statute is to be applied as written. 14
However, if the statute contains no express command, the court
must decide whether it would have retroactive effect, i.e. "whether
it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed."' 5 Finally, if the stat-
ute will operate retroactively, "it does not govern absent clear con-
gressional intent favoring such a result." 6
The final prong of the test is based on equity and fairness.
"The presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence and embodies ... elementary considerations
of fairness [that] dictate that individuals should have an opportu-
nity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accord-
ingly, settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted."'7
The Court was careful to explain that a statute does not apply
retroactively merely because it applies in a case arising from
actions antedating the statute's enactment.' 8 Rather, a court
must discern whether the provision attaches new legal conse-
quences to events completed before its enactment. The Court
stated that the determination is the conclusion of a process of
judgment concerning the "nature and extent of change in the law
and the degree of connection between the operation of the new
rule and a relevant past event."' 9
The Court noted three instances where applying a statute to
past events would not have a retroactive effect. First, the Court
stated that injunctive relief operates "in futuro" and, therefore,
provisions relating to such laws can properly be applied to pend-
ing cases.2 ° Second, the Court noted that it has regularly applied
statutes affecting jurisdiction because application of such a rule
usually "takes away no substantive right."21 Finally, procedural
rules can be applied without raising retroactivity concerns
14. Id. at 280.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. (citing General Motors v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181
(1992); Karser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842
(1990)).
18. Id. at 269.
19. Id. at 270.
20. Id. at 273-274.
21. Id. at 274. (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
160 [Vol. 20:157
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because these rules regulate secondary as opposed to primary con-
duct.22 The Court noted that reliance interests in matters of pro-
cedure are also not substantial.
23
B. Post-Landgraf Retroactivity.
In Lindh v. Murphy,24 the Supreme Court resolved the issue
of whether Chapter 153 of the AEDPA, addressing petitions for
habeas corpus relief in non-capital cases, governs applications
that were pending when the act was passed. The specific section
at issue altered the standard under which the prior judgment is
evaluated. The statute of limitations provision was not addressed.
However, the Court elaborated on the proper application of the
Landgraf test.25 The holding in Lindh states that "[in determin-
ing whether a statute's terms would produce a retroactive effect,
and in determining a statute's temporal reach generally, our nor-
mal rules of construction apply."26
Applying traditional rules of construction, the Court reasoned
that the provisions at issue were made expressly applicable to
pending capital cases, and so by negative implication, the amend-
ments were not meant to apply to pending noncapital cases where
there was no express command for such application. 27 This con-
clusion was bolstered by the fact that the portions of the AEDPA
treated differently were considered simultaneously when the lan-
guage raising the implication was added.2" The majority con-
cluded that the section at issue applied only to noncapital cases
filed after the effective date of the AEDPA.
C. The Minority Approach
To date, only a handful of district courts have applied the
shortened limitations period to pre-accrued claims. 29 However,
the majority of the these cases are from the Fourth Circuit. Curtis
v. Class30 and Clarke v. United States 31 provide the most thor-
22. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275.
23. Id.
24. Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
25. Id. at 2060.
26. Id. at 2063.
27. Id. at 2068. (The amendments include the one year limitations period.
However, the Court left open the question of whether application of the statute to
cases filed after enactment is permissible.).
28. Id.
29. See supra note 6 for a list of these cases.
30. Curtis, 939 F. Supp. 703.
1997]
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ough justification for applying the amendment to bar pre-accrued
claims. Applying the Landgraf test, the Curtis court first found
no intent as to when the amendments were to take effect. There-
fore, the court proceeded to analyze whether the statute would
"increase ... liability or impose new duties."32 Two reasons were
put forth as to why the statute was not retroactive under Lan-
dgraf: 1) the amendments governing habeas relief are prospective
in nature; and 2) the amendments are procedural and regulate
secondary conduct only.33 Citing a number of Eighth Circuit cases
which applied new statutes of limitations to claims accrued but
not filed, the court held the application of the new statute to §2255
claims filed after enactment is not impermissibly retroactive.34
In Clarke, the court relied upon Landgrafs primary/secon-
dary conduct distinction and found the statute of limitations to
address only secondary conduct.3 The court analogized the
AEDPA statute of limitations to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 stat-
ute of limitations, which was applied to bar pre-accrued claims in
the Fifth, Sixth, and Second Circuits under a Landgraf analysis.36
The Virginia court did not resolve the related issues of fairness
and reliance, limiting its determination instead to a literal read-
ing of the Landgraf test. The conduct addressed by the statute
was not found to be the primary conduct of the defendant and
application of the statute neither increased liability for past con-
duct, imposed new duties, nor impaired the rights a party pos-
sessed at the time he acted.3
The same court in United States v. Smith 31 upheld its earlier
decision and addressed the Department of Justice's self-imposed
one-year grace period. 39 The court was troubled by what it consid-
ered a usurpation of Congressional power by the Attorney Gen-
eral.4 ° The court held that it would continue to bar petitions filed
after April 24, 1996 when the convictions were final for over a
year.
31. Clarke, 955 F. Supp. 593.
32. Curtis, 939 F. Supp. at 707.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 708.
35. Clarke, 955 F. Supp. at 596.
36. Id. See also Garfield v. J.C. Real Estate, 57 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 1995);
Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1990).
37. Clarke, 955 F. Supp. at 596.
38. 966 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1997).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 410.
[Vol. 20:157162
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The crux of the above decisions is that the amendments are
procedural and do not affect substantive rights and therefore, the
statute of limitations falls within Landgrafs exception for proce-
dural laws. For example, the Clarke court relied upon a line of
cases outside the Fourth Circuit which applied the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA)41 statute of limitations as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 Most influential was
the Fifth Circuit's rationale in St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Com-
pensation Commission.4 3 There, the court cited Landgraf for the
proposition that procedural changes should be applied to suits
arising before enactment due to the diminished reliance interests
and because procedural rules govern secondary, rather than pri-
mary conduct.44 The court stated that the statute of limitations
addressed only the power of the court to hear the case and not the
conduct of the defendant.45 The St. Louis court further stated
that the issue was not technically one of retroactivity.4 6
D. The Majority Approach
A majority of courts have granted grace periods before enforc-
ing the AEDPA's statute of limitations for § 2255 petitions. 4v The
most substantive analysis is found in the circuit court opinions,
several of which have relied upon portions of the Landgraf opinion
for their holdings.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1985).
42. The former statute of limitations allowed for a charge to be filed within
two years of the date of discrimination alleged in the charge. The amendment
eliminated the two year limit and requires that an ADEA lawsuit be filed any
time after 60 days after a charge is filed until 90 days after the receipt of notice
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has completed
action on the charge. See Clarke, 955 F. Supp. at 596-597.
43. 65 F.3d 43 (5th Cir. 1995).
44. Id. at 46.
45. Id.
46. The court stated:
Indeed, although the defendant frames the issue as one of retroactivity,
the issue is not technically one of retroactivity, where a change in the
law overturns a judicial adjudication of rights that has already become
final. In this case, the statute of limitations is applied to conduct that
occurred after the statute's enactment-the plaintiffs filing of the
complaint-not to the allegedly discriminatory acts of the defendant.
The only issue is which law to apply to the plaintiffs acts.
Id.
47. See supra note 4.
1997]
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In the Seventh Circuit's Lindh v. Murphy4 opinion, the court
in dicta stated that application of the amended § 2255 could
"attach new legal consequences to events other than the crime and
the state's legal processes and judgment."49 The petitioner in that
case filed his petition within one year of the final decision of the
state supreme court.50 However, citing reliance interests, the
court stated that if he had not, the statute of limitations would not
bar his petition. 51 The court noted, "we do not doubt that the
Court would give a plaintiff who files after the enactment a rea-
sonable post-amendment time to get litigation underway."52 The
court found that a reasonable time and the one-year statutory
period coalesce and therefore no petition filed prior to April 24,
1997 may be dismissed.5" The Second Circuit has also used this
reasonable time approach, but granted only seventy-two days
instead of a year. 4
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Simmonds55
was guided by the fairness concerns articulated by the Landgraf
Court.56 Admitting that a change in the statute of limitations
usually does not bring up retroactivity concerns, the court cau-
tioned that such statutes cannot be so unfair as to bar suit before
the claimant has had a reasonable opportunity to bring it. 57
Applied literally to the plaintiff's case, the court stated that the
new limitations period would result in a severe instance of retro-
activity and strip the petitioner of his rights without prior
notice.5 8
In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central
District of California 59 the Ninth Circuit cited the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Lindh decision and the Landgraf opinion for the proposition
that application of § 2244's new statute of limitations would be
48. 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
49. Id. at 865.
50. Id. at 866.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2nd Cir. 1997) (stating that there
was no proof Congress intended to cut off access to federal courts by state
prisoners who lacked notice of the new limitations period).
55. 111 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1997).
56. Id. at 745.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 112 F.3d 386 (9th Cir. 1997).
164 [Vol. 20:157
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retroactive and would "attach new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment."6 °
The ultimate result of the above cases is that the statute of
limitations as applied to pre-accrued claims is impermissibly ret-
roactive and consequently, prisoners must be allowed a reason-
able time to file their claims. To justify this result, both Calderon
and Simmonds rely upon the Supreme Court's rationale in Texaco
v. Short.6 ' In Texaco, the Court addressed an Indiana statute
which destroyed mineral rights not used in the last twenty years
unless the mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the local
recorder's office.62 The Court relied upon Wilson v. Iseminger"3 for
the proposition that new statutes of limitations must allow a rea-
sonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits
upon existing causes of action. 4 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
were guided by the Wilson rationale combined with the underly-
ing fairness considerations found in Landgraf in determining how
to apply the amended § 2255.
III. ANALYsis
The two competing approaches to § 2255's statute of limita-
tions have very different outcomes for one seeking a writ of habeas
corpus who delayed for more than a year before filing his or her
petition. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze both rationales,
60. Id. at 389 (quoting Landgraf v. USI FILM Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270
(1994)).
61. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). The statute in question allowed an owner to refile his
claim and in effect gave the owner another 20 year period. Therefore, the statute
did not abolish vested rights without notice.
62. Id.
63. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
64. It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must
proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to
try his right in the courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of
claimants without affording this opportunity; if it should attempt to do
so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrary, whatever might be the purport of its
provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time
after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing
causes of action.
Id. at 62. The statute at issue in Wilson was similar to the act discussed in
Texaco. Even though the statute acted to abolish a fee simple interest in land it
was held valid because the statute contained a grace period in which owners
could protect their rights. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 526.
1997] 165
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seek alternatives and adopt the approach that carries out Con-
gress's intended reforms in the least draconian manner.
A. Analysis of the Minority Approach
As noted above, the courts which apply the statute of limita-
tions to bar claims which accrued prior to the effective date of the
statute rely exclusively on Landgraf or its interpretation by other
courts. However, this rationale is erroneous for three reasons.
First, cases applying Landgraf to the ADEA statute of limitations
are distinguishable; second, these courts have overlooked impor-
tant underlying considerations which support the presumption
against the retroactive application of laws such as fairness and
reliance; and finally, the shortened limitations period affects more
than the power of the court to hear a petition.
1. Case Law Cited By The Minority View Is Distinguishable.
The ADEA statute of limitations and § 2255's limitation
period are not similar so as to be interpreted the same for retroac-
tivity purposes. Therefore, cases which involve these two statutes
have fact patterns which raise different concerns.
For example, a comparison of the respective plaintiffs in
United States v. Clarke65 and St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Compen-
sation Commission reveals important dissimilarities. In St.
Louis, the plaintiff filed his charge on July 8, 1991, the alleged
discrimination occurring earlier that year. 7 On November 21,
1991 the ADEA statute of limitations was amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff received his right to sue letter on
July 17, 1992.68 The letter included language warning the plain-
tiff that the two-year statute of limitation was no longer in
effect.6 9 Despite the warning of the change in law, the plaintiff
failed to file suit within the required time.70
65. 955 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Va. 1997).
66. 65 F.3d 43 (5th Cir. 1995).
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id.
69. The letter contained the following language:
Because it is not clear whether this amendment applies to instances of
alleged discrimination occurring before November 21, 1991, if Charging
party decides to sue, a lawsuit should be brought within two years of the
date of the alleged discrimination and within ninety days of receipt of
this letter, whichever is earlier, in order to assure the right to sue.
Id.
70. Id.
166 [Vol. 20:157
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Therefore, the plaintiff in that case had notice of the change
in law and an opportunity to file suit after the statute of limita-
tions was shortened. The petitioner in Clarke, however filed suit
on October 21, 1996, six months after the AEDPA was signed into
law. 71 The court dismissed his petition given the fact that his con-
viction became final in 1990.72 It is clear that Clarke relied upon
existing law which allowed an unlimited amount of time to file,
had no notice of the new limitation until after his period had run,
and was not permitted to file after the change in law. The applica-
tion of the St. Louis rationale to Clarke's petition resulted in the
destruction of a substantive right without notice, the very result
the Landgraf Court sought to avoid. Given the dissimilar posi-
tions of the two respective plaintiffs before and after the limita-
tions periods were shortened, the Clarke court reached the wrong
conclusion by following the St. Louis rationale.
2. Overriding Considerations Of Reliance And Fairness
Must Be Addressed.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Landgraf, noted
that, "the presumption against statutory retroactivity has consist-
ently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing
new burdens on persons after the fact."73 Therefore, fairness
should be a central concern when deciding the temporal reach of a
statute where Congress has not made its intent clear. By discuss-
ing procedural laws, the Court was not holding that all laws that
could be deemed procedural should be applied retrospectively.74
Rather, the Court was merely depicting one example where appli-
cation of new law to past events would not have a truly retroactive
effect. As the Court stated, "traditional retroactivity'concerns are
present in some procedural statutes."75 Therefore, the minority's
conclusion that the statute of limitations in question is procedural
does not end the issue. The court must go further and determine
whether vested rights are affected. 76
The Landgraf Court also cited diminished reliance interests
in matters of procedure as a justification for applying such rules to
71. Clarke, 955 F. Supp. at 594.
72. Id.
73. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
74. Id. at 275 n.29.
75. Id. The court noted, "[nior do we suggest that concerns about retroactivity
have no application to procedural rules." Id.
76. Id.
19971
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events antedating enactment. 7 However, as the Seventh Circuit
noted in Lindh v. Murphy,"8 an inmate's reliance interest in an
unlimited amount of time to file could be substantial.79 Prisoners
are given limited access to law library facilities and it may often
take the uneducated inmate much study to discover the basis for
his habeas petition. Furthermore, such prisoners may be trans-
ferred or forced to rely upon the expertise of other inmates in
developing their arguments. Such conditions serve only to
increase one's reliance on the status quo, unlike one in less confin-
ing circumstances.
3. The Shortened Statute Of Limitations Affects More Than
The Power Of The Court To Hear A Petition. A Statute Of
Limitation Is More Than A Jurisdictional Requirement Or
A Mode Of Procedure.
The relevant conduct regulated by the amended § 2255 is not
only the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, but the actions of
the inmate in filing his petition. The statute essentially forces a
prisoner to file within one year or lose his opportunity. Therefore,
the fact that the amended § 2255 controls the subject matter juris-
diction of the court serves as scant justification for imposing it
retrospectively.
Furthermore, this issue is not a "clean" retroactivity analysis
due to the fact that the plaintiff filed his claim after the new law
came into effect. The initial application of the Landgraf test was
conducted on a pending case, in which the defendant was the
party most affected by the change in law. Therefore a court could
properly apply the three test factors to the change in the law: (1)
increase in liability; (2) imposition of new duties; or (3) impair-
ment of rights that a party possessed when he acted. 0 However,
to apply this rationale to a plaintiff petitioning for habeas corpus
is awkward unless one assumes that the conduct burdened is the
prisoner's inaction. It is equally tenuous to argue that the right to
file a habeas corpus petition is a right subject to impairment that
77. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 (citing Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71,
(1949)).
78. 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
79. Id. at 866. The Court noted, "[a] prisoner's decision to defer filing-
perhaps while doing legal research or while waiting for the Supreme Court to
decide a case that could influence the selection of issues-is the sort of event to
which the amended statute would attach new legal consequences." Id.
80. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
168 [Vol. 20:157
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a criminal possessed when he broke the law. Under a literal
application of the Landgraf test, this type of reasoning would be
necessary to determine whether a statute of limitations had a
truly retroactive effect. It is therefore clear that the three-part
Landgraf test'should be confined to the context of a new law that
affects a defendant in a pending case. However, the fairness con-
cerns should not be overlooked under any circumstances.
B. Analysis of Majority Approach
The courts which have granted a reasonable grace period
after April 24, 1996 in which to file § 2255 petitions have reached
their conclusion through a variety of means."' For example, the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits rely upon notions of equity and the
Supreme Court's holding in Wilson v. Iseminger. 2 The Seventh
Circuit in Lindh, however, made no mention of statute of limita-
tions specifically; rather they chose to support their decision on
the view that one's right to rely upon existing law is paramount.8 3
However, several courts have adopted a grace period with no
explanation at all. 4 It is the conclusion of this comment that the
majority approach is consistent with Supreme Court decisions
construing the proper application of statute of limitations; how-
ever, clarification is necessary.
In Terry v. Anderson, 5 the Supreme Court held that "statutes
of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a
reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before
the bar takes effect."8 6 Therefore, the issue when addressing a
81. See United States v. Ramos, 971 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court,
concerned with unidentified "constitutional implications," refused to dismiss the
petitioner's motion based on a 1993 final conviction where the petition was filed
three months after the effective date of the AEDPA.
82. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
83. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 866. It is unclear why the Seventh Circuit chose to
allow a one-year grace period. The court stated that if the petitioner's (Lindh)
claim had not been timely filed under a literal application of the statute, it would
not be dismissed for reliance reasons. However, the court went on to state that
"Lindh lacks any reliance interests nearly that strong." Id.
84. See, United States v. Jones, 963 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1997); Smith v.
United States, 945 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Colo. 1996) (finding literal application of the
AEDPA statute of limitations to be "intolerable").
85. 95 U.S. 628 (1877).
86. Id. at 632-33. A suit was brought to enforce the liability of stockholders of
a bank under a provision in the banks charter. Subsequent to the banks
insolvency, a law was passed which shortened the period in which to bring suit
for the liability. The Court held that the plaintiffs were provided with a
1997]
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legislatively shortened limitations period is whether the new limit
allows the plaintiff to bring suit.8 7 The Landgraf decision was not
intended to change the rather uninterrupted Supreme Court his-
tory of allowing a reasonable time to file suit after a legislatively
shortened statute of limitations is enacted.88 The Court's justifi-
cation for the Landgraf analysis is fairness and equity and lends
support to the earlier holdings in Wilson and Terry.
As noted earlier, a literal application of the Landgraf test in
the context of a statute of limitations can result in tortured rea-
soning and unwarranted results.8 9 The Fifth Circuit rationale in
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. F.D.I.C. ,90 is the proper syn-
thesis of the Landgraf opinion with prior Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. 9 There, the court differentiated between procedural rules
which affect a plaintiffs conduct and those which merely affect the
court. The court held that they would only apply procedural
changes to existing causes of action where those changes did not
deprive a litigant of his day in court.92 In such circumstances, the
reasonable time to bring their suit. Id. Furthermore, the Court held that parties
to a contract have no vested interest in a particular limitation and that the
legislature may change them at its discretion, provided adequate means of
enforcing the right remain." Id. at 633.
87. Calvin Corman, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 2.4.3, at 153-154 (1991).
88. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244. No where in the Court's opinion are statutes
of limitation specifically addressed. The historical allowance of a reasonable
grace period is found in Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902), Terry v.
Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877), and United States v. Morena, 245 U.S. 392 (1918).
In Morena, the Court interpreted a Federal law which stated that aliens must
petition for citizenship within seven years of declaring their intent to become
citizens. Id. at 393. Morena, an alien, had declared his intent to become a
citizen before enactment of the statute but had waited more than seven years to
file his petition for citizenship. The Court, citing Wilson, held that aliens who
declared before the statute took effect had seven years from the date of
enactment to petition for citizenship. Id. at 397. The Court stated: "A limitation
of time even upon the assertion of a right theretofore having no limitation upon
its assertion, or a different limitation, is not infrequent, and its legality is
unquestionable if a time reasonable, in view of the subject-matter, be given." Id.
89. A shining example is the Fifth Circuit's opinion in St. Louis in which the
court stated that the issue was not one of retroactivity but nevertheless
proceeded to apply the Landgraf test. St. Louis, 65 F.3d at 45.
90. 21 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. The court held that the section of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, imposing a 60-day time limit on request
for review of final determinations by the FDIC did not apply retroactively.
92. Id. at 701. "When Congress adopts statutory changes while a suit is
pending, the effect of which is not to eliminate substantive rights but rather to
'change the tribunal which will hear the case', those changes - barring
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substantive rights of the parties are not affected.93 This case was
decided after the Landgraf decision, and construes the Court's dis-
cussion of the proper application of statutory procedural rules in
light of the underlying fairness considerations which support the
presumption against retroactivity.
94
Applied to a petition filed a year or more after a prisoner's
final conviction but within a reasonable time after the enactment
of the AEDPA, the rationale in Hartford Casualty leads to the
proper result by adopting the most coherent approach. Assuming
arguendo that the change in law is procedural or jurisdictional,
Hartford Casualty requires a court to consider the rights affected
by the party subject to the change in law and avoids a rigid, inap-
propriate application of the Landgraf test. As discussed earlier,
these requirements are implicit in the Landgraf opinion; however,
courts that have barred pre-accrued claims have justified their
conclusion solely on a literal application of the three-part test.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rationale in Hartford Casualty is the most enlightened
and plausible justification for the majority approach. The change
in § 2255's limitation period as applied to pre-accrued claims
changes a great deal more than which tribunal can hear the case.
As applied by the minority, the change wipes out a substantive
right arbitrarily and without notice. Such an extinction of rights
flies in the face of existing Supreme Court precedent and is mani-
festly unjust.95
Over a year has passed since the enactment of the Anti-Ter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Therefore, prisoners who
have not filed and whose statutory period expired before the
AEDPA was enacted should be barred from filing in order to carry
out Congress's intent of reducing the number of frivolous petitions
for habeas corpus filed in federal court. However laudable the
goal, such a result can not come at the expense of substantive
specifically expressed intent to the contrary - will have immediate effect." Id.
(quoting Turboffv. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 867 F.2d 1518,
1521 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916))).
93. Id.
94. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 21 F.3d at 700.
95. See Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Therein the Court
stated that changes in the law should not be applied which would infringe upon
or deprive a person of a right that had matured and would impose unanticipated
obligations upon a party without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 720.
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rights. Those unlucky few who filed their petitions shortly after
the statute was signed into law should not be made into martyrs
in the war against judicial inefficiency.
Brian E. Moore
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